Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar Observation from the Palestinian Second Intifada

Table of contents

1- Introduction.

 2-The Troubling History of the Humanitarian Movement

4- Theatricalization of human disaster

5-Médecins Sans Frontières- MSF : a Rebellions Humanitarianism..

6-Right of intervention: Paradoxes between moral and interests.

8-Can the state undertake humanitarian action?.

9-Crisis in the Humanitarian Movement

10-How the Palestinian NGOs interact with the humanitarian organizations?

16-Bibliography.

 Introduction

In the reconstruction of the war-torn societies and in the (post)conflict area, the international organizations, and especially the humanitarian movement, have played a major role as new actors in international relations. If historically (until the 1970s) the humanitarian organizations and their actions rarely contested the borders or the sovereignty of the nation-state, now they are part of a new supra-national group of actors who advocate the end of state immunity. Their role and status has changed tremendously in the last three decades. For instance, the emergence of a professionalized body as ideal-type, in reply to the solidarity group as ideal-type, has had a major impact on the length the conflicts and the type of their political settlement.

Although humanitarian action has come to be idealized, it has had a controversial and troubling history. This communication will look carefully at the historical change of the structure and role of the humanitarian movement and the new types of encounters with local society, and in particular with the local NGOs. Many questions will be examined: the right of intervention: real politick or political illusion?; the duty of the witness and the lacking of many humanitarian organizations to this duty; the relation between the humanitarian movement and the media, and the theatricalization of human disaster. Finally, the behavior of the humanitarian movement during Palestinian national transition (mainly the second intifada) will be scrutinized, with a specific focus on its interaction with the local NGOs. 

 The Troubling History of the Humanitarian Movement   

With the fall of communist system, the humanitarian movement has become active internationally. This movement’s objective is to promote the dignity of victims during an armed conflict or a natural catastrophe. Unlike development aid agencies, the humanitarian movement does not have the ambition of transforming the recipient society. According to the objectives pronounced by some of the founders of the humanitarian movement, it operates according to humanistic ethics and is guided by a concern for the other- not the defense of interests. Does this mean that its actors should be independent from political power; has this been the case throughout the history of this movement?

Humanitarian action has had a controversial history. Dating as far back as the sixth century, religious institutions have been concerned with the victims of war. Two organizations were funded by the Church in France: la Paix de Dieu (the Peace of God) and la Trêve de Dieu (the Truce of God). However during this period, religious institutions that were interested in protecting Christians become warlike organizations. Some of the religious orders born during the XI and XII century, like Saint Jean of Jerusalem (which was later transformed to the Order of Malt) become an institution which massacred the population in Jerusalem and participated in the permanent control of the territories of Jerusalem (Brauman, 2000: 16-17).

Assisting the poor, through charity, was one of the focuses of the religious institutions. However, the philosophy of the Enlightenment encouraged another form of charity, known as philanthropy (in French: bienfaisance), rooted in a secular terms, its frame of reference for morality and ethics is rooted in human philosophical works, as opposed to being divinely sanctioned. 

For centuries, charity and philanthropy were carried out internally within European states. It was not until the XIX century that humanitarian action was extended beyond state borders. Humanitarian organizations were established in the European capitals: the Red Cross in 1863 in Geneva, and then Salvation Army in 1865 in London. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can be considered the first international organizations for humanitarian action. As an International non-governmental organization, its headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland; it seeks to aid victims of war and to ensure the observance of humanitarian law by all parties in a conflict. The ICRC is now one component of a large network including national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

After the First World War many organizations began receiving funding from states and also from the Society of Nations,including the High Commission for Refugees (HCR).

The principal of neutrality is the central characteristic of these organizations, but it also represents one of their greatest weaknesses. Under the auspice of the HCR for example, population transfers were carried out between Greece and Turkey in 1922. This ‘normal’ operation of ethnical purification did not stop the HCR from receiving the Nobel Price in that same year.

The real growth of these organizations occurred after World War II, with the creation of the CIMAD in France (le Comité Inter-Movements Auprès des Evacuées), which was established by the protestant Church in 1939 to rescue the refugees that had fled from the Nazis. Then CARE (American Remittances to Europe) was set up in 1945, followed by the Catholic Relief Services, established by the Protestants of Church World Services. However, the period following the Second World War was dominated by the grafting of a new international order under American tutelage; humanitarian action remained marginal, while development organizations proliferated in the former colonies- courtiers in order to ‘buy’ influence. During this time , the states intensify their interest in such organizations: Charles De Gulles launched Les Volontaires du Progress while Kennedy launched the Peace Corps (Brauman, 1996: 16). 

With de-colonization underway in the post-war period, humanitarian organizations oriented their actions toward the ‘Third World’. To combat growing communist influence but also to incorporate the de-colonizing countries into the new international order, the Western countries, especially the United States and others through the UN, established development organizations for this purpose like the UNDP, USAID, BIRD, Terre des Hommes in Switzerland and CEBEMO in Holland. However, at the same time, many international organizations were influenced by the ideology of the Third Worldism and a type of Socialist Catholicism. These organizations established small development projects at the village level in non-Western countries; the projects, first considered contemptuous, began to be recognized by international donor agency as very efficient in the 1980’s.

Until the 1970s humanitarian organizations and their actions rarely contested the borders or the sovereignty of the nation-state. Greenpeace represents the first international organization to contest the French nuclear tests in the Pacific. Moreover, at this time the humanitarian movement entered its third phase. This new phase is embodied in organizations that base their actions on the ‘moral imperative behind intervening in an emergency’, according to the words of Brauman. In this case, the act of intervening is abstracted from and understood separately from the nature of the state in the context where the humanitarian organization intervenes. This means that the humanitarian organization enters the recipient society, in spite of the position this organization may have about the ruling regime. In a revealing example, in November 1978 at a humanitarian ship, L’ile de Lumière, we find for the first time both Jean-Paul Sartre (a Marxist philosopher) and Raymond Aron (a French sociologist anti-communist) each giving a speech to salute the humanitarian mission taking off towards the Chinese Sea. 

The creation of international humanitarian laws was one factor, which propelled the institutionalization of the humanitarian movement. Throughout the 19th and early 20th century, numerous military operations and diplomatic missions, not all of them with the purest of motives, but in the name of "humanitarian intervention" (a customary international law doctrine)[1], undertook to ‘protect’ oppressed and persecuted minorities in the Ottoman Empire and in Syria, Crete, various Balkan countries, Romania, and Russia. Parallel to such actions, first at the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) and later in the inter war period, a series of treaties and international declarations sought the protection of certain racial, religious, and linguistic minorities in central and Eastern Europe and in the Middle East. During the same period the movement to combat and suppress slavery and the slave trade found expression in treaties sooner or later involving the major commercial powers, beginning with the Treaty of Paris (1814) and culminating in the International Slavery Convention (1926).

Until the beginning of 1990s, humanitarian movement was completely separated from development organizations. However this has change since. Today a new concept has emerged, complex emergencies, a term coined in the post-cold war era to describe violent conflicts often involving intra-state strife with regional implications. These types of emergencies often result in massive numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, gross violations of human rights and large-scale dislocation and disruption of people's livelihoods. As of 1992, there were approximately 17.5 million war refugees and 24 million internally displaced persons throughout the world. International NGOs’ complex humanitarian emergency programs were taking place in countries such as Burundi, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. The international organizations, which are present in these countries, provide aid to those most severely impacted by violent conflict within a declared operational framework of saving lives, sustaining livelihoods and strengthening civil society. In this regard, today objectives are no longer mere relief, but also include developmentalist and political (democracy promotion) dimensions. If the international politics order bring an endeavor to extend the scope of the humanitarian action, what are the factors from inside the Western societies which encourage the humanitarian organizations? The role of media in theatricalization of human disaster was so important in this regard.

 Theatricalization of human disaster

The1980s by far was the decade of the refugees. The number of refugee increased according to the HCR from 3 million in 1977, to 11 million in 1983. Through the mass media’s image of war, atrocities and the misery of the refugee camps, the western public was not only informed but also saturated with details about the refugees throughout the world. Since the beginning of this decade, the humanitarian movement has become, at times a state impelled movement, pushed not only by the demands of the public but by the increasing willingness of government to use humanitarian action as part of their foreign relations, especially following the end of the cold war. While some Western governments like France were passive when confronted with the committed in Rwanda by the Tusu majority, which is an ally of the French government, ‘official’ humanitarianism become a formidable tool to camouflage the inaction and the resignation of the international community (Brauman, 2000,:70-80).

All this however does not explain why humanitarian intervention has significantly increased. What we are witnessing here does not necessarily reflect the victory of altruism, but what Gilles Lipovetsky considers as ‘moral comfort’ and a new modality of the hedonistic satisfaction. In this respect, the media plays a major role in bringing the plight of populations to the attention of the general public. The theatricalization of human disaster, the power to shock, and the spectacle of humanitarian action satisfies the people, and confirms their self-image as virtuous and upright individuals. Aid is self-gratifying for donor countries as well, by providing assistance they feel good; a product of the tangible evidence that they are doing something to help and assist. In this sense, compassion and pity are replaced or placated by the reflection of justice filtered through the media. Other questions are left aside, including, why are these victims arriving in the refugee camps? What is the role and responsibility of the Western countries and the international order in creating these problems?

Having provided a brief history of the humanitarian movement, we will question the perspective, principals and commitments of this movement from a series of angles: the right to make witness, right of intervention. Using the word ‘movement’ does not mean that it is homogeneous, many trends can be found under the humanitarian banner. Here we will focus on the Doctors without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières- MSF), an example of a new type of humanitarian organizations. However the conclusions that we draw go beyond this organization.

 Médecins Sans Frontières- MSF : a Rebellions Humanitarianism

In 1971, a group of French doctors founded Doctors without Borders (MSF), the first non-military, non-governmental organization to specialize in emergency medical assistance, and to link medical humanitarian action and human rights advocacy. Most of the founders of this organization worked for the Red Cross in Biafra between 1968 and 1970. In fact, the Biafra crisis was a milestone in the evolution of the humanitarian movement. Emerging out of this experience, the founders of MSF aim is to rectify what they perceive as the shortcomings of international aid: that it offers too little medical assistance and that aid agencies are overly reticent in the face of the many legal and administrative obstacles to the provision of effective humanitarian relief. These individuals distinguish themselves from other aid workers; particularly, in that they are aware of the role of the media in bringing the plight of populations to the attention of the general public.

Contrary to the International Red Cross model, MSF refuses to wait for the approval of all parties before acting. It insists on the right to speak out in the face of human rights violations. Putting the priority on populations in danger, above political considerations, is the core part of its mission - and in this MSF has helped shape the humanitarian movement worldwide. One should understand this as a difficult choice between denunciation (at the risk of expulsion) and silence (at the risk of complicity).

The core concept buttressing the medical and the human rights actions undertaken by Doctors Without Borders is the ‘right to interfere’ (le droit d’ingérence), articulated mainly by one of the founders of this organization, Bernard Kouchner. This concept as Fox argues (1999: 420-421) is anchored in the belief that there is an “ardent obligation to act” to alleviate the suffering of people. This commitment embraced by a new bred of humanitarian organizations, raises the issue of the conditionality of humanitarian aid. As Bouchet-Saulnier (2000) suggests although the practice of conditionality began as a way of promoting peace and human rights, in practice it violates the only absolute principle of humanitarian action: impartiality.

By awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to the "rebellious humanitarianism" of Médecins Sans Frontières, the Nobel Committee chose to reward the at times controversial choices made by MSF, for this organization sees acting and speaking as two inseparable elements of providing relief to endangered populations.

MSF does not see itself as a cog in the machinery of international solidarity that responds to medical needs like some eager hired hand summoned to deal with the failures of states or of global privatization. MSF sees in these medical needs often deliberate choices to exclude certain populations, or symptoms of the dysfunction of societies in general and of the international society in particular. In cases such as these, material relief is simply not enough. Indeed, by providing such relief, organizations often run the risk of giving a semblance of normalcy to situations of extreme violence.

In spite all of the efforts of these humanitarian actors to deconstruct the idea of humanitarian intervention, their actions inevitably have unintended consequences and effects on the ongoing reconstruction of the local and the social in war-torn societies. Many studies show how the role of humanitarian relief inadvertently prolongs armed conflicts, particularly in Africa. For instance, in Somalia, food aid was stolen by military faction, this strengthened the factions, making them stronger, and prolonging the conflict. Or in other contexts, aid does not prolong the conflict, but infixes and lodges aspects of the armed conflict, which are transitory and imposed by the colonial power. The water projects in Palestine are a good example. The construction of the infrastructure reflects the patchwork system of Israel control over Palestinian towns and villages. The water networks do not link up the Palestinian towns, i.e. in Qalqylia. Israel refuses to link up water networks between towns, and there is no pressure from the US government to link the network. If there were linkages, it would be much cheaper.

Working in complex context, have the humanitarian organizations been manipulated by the States in the conflict (or post-conflict) area? In some cases, authorities allow relief operations only in order to more effectively conceal their hostile intentions toward certain populations. They may also intentionally create the suffering and deprivations of such people, in order to attract and divert the aid provided for them. In such situations, humanitarian organizations react in various ways. Some believe that they have no responsibility - and no capacity - to influence the political, military or economic context, and that they risk manipulation or a corruption of their actions. They regard themselves as accountable only for the quality of their intended relief operations. Others, however, believe that relief organizations have operational responsibility, reflected in their ability to negotiate, make public statements, and, perhaps, even suspend their relief activities. This responsibility is an essential counterweight to the significant political, military and economic constraints imposed upon their actions (Bouchet-Saulnier, 2000). With this statement, we can now go deeply to discuss the concept of the right of the humanitarian organizations and the state to intervene and the paradoxes underpinning the right of intervention.

 Right of intervention: Paradoxes between moral and interests

  The right of intervention or the "duty" of intervention - to which the word "humanitarian" was soon added - was coined in the late 1980s by Mario Bettati, Professor of International Public Law at the University of Paris II, and by the French politician Bernard Kouchner, one of the founders of the aid organization Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders), (Corten, 1999). This ‘right’ or ‘duty’ of intervention is considered as being above international legal standards. However in practice, the notion that humanitarian intervention transcends the legal and political framework of the international systems is up to now a political illusion and a juridical fiction. It is a political illusion because intervention has mainly been conducted in situations where the state has collapsed: Somalia without a legitimate government, Iraq without sovereignty in its Northern territory after the ‘Desert Storm’ operation, Bosnia where the UN forces already govern ‘Sarajevo’. A Juridical fiction because the UN resolutions 43/131 (en 1988) and 45/100 (en 1990) only recognize the positive role of NGOs and include a caveat, reiterating the primordial character of state sovereignty and prioritizing the role of governments in the concerned area. Moreover, the UN, which is based on classical international legal categories, like non-intervention, territorial integrity and the self-determination of peoples, cannot contravene these principles and make opposing claims, without a radical restructuring.

In addition to this, the idea of the right of intervention has found little resonance in smaller countries. Colonial memories are still fresh in many societies. The principle of non-intervention was fought for by the weakest countries and was the result of a historic battle waged by them. Throughout the 19th century, they were subjected to colonialization and imperialism, at the hands of nations, claiming to act in the name of "civilized" values, but the double standard, was clear. Real-politick and a consideration for practical and material interests, as opposed to ethical and theoretical formulations, were the main factors guiding intervention in certain areas; at the same time, other states which clearly violate human rights (like Israel and Saudi Arabia) remained beyond criticism. Without a doubt, the 1990s saw a renewed focus on legal and humanitarian principles in the official language of the United Nations and national governments, and in the language of NGOs. However, this does not necessarily reflect a victory for legal and moral principles. Incidents in Kosovo and throughout Africa have shown that at times, real-politick interests override the concern for law and justice. Similarly in some instances, politicians have used humanitarian actions as a camouflage for crimes perpetuated by the state.

One of the defenders of the ‘right of intervention’, Mario Bettati, recognized the ambiguity of this phrase, as defined in opposition to a restrictive, rigid interpretation of sovereignty (Bettati, 1991: 640). Corten adds that this “term just by itself has no legal content". "It only acquires any when it is accompanied by the adjective ‘humanitarian’. By virtue of the purpose it gives to intervention, the adjective removes the unlawful aspect which everyone associates with it. A lawyer would prefer the expression ‘right to provide humanitarian assistance’, which defines the purpose more clearly and sounds less like a subjective and implicit clash - which after all it isn't - with the anti-colonialist principles of ‘non-intervention’ and ‘non-interference’” (Corten, 1999).

Finally, in the discipline of international relations the debate continues between the realists and the idealists, each of which have adopted respectively the state sovereignty position and the moral position. Historically and during the twentieth century, the juridical tradition of non-intervention has dominated international relations theory and practice, as set within the post Westphalia international system (the two treaties of August and September 1648, following the end of the Thirty Year war). This position considers state sovereignty as the foundation of the political order. In contrast to this, the moral tradition focuses on the duty of the public authority to intervene on behalf of victims of aggression and injustice (Hehir, 1999). This moral tradition remained a minor trend in international politics until very recently. However, since the 1990s, ethnical purification in Bosnia as well as the genocide of Rwanda and the case of ‘de-structured’ states like Somalia, have reinforced the moral position and installed humanitarian intervention at the center of international relations. But state’s national interests have set limits on the moral argument in favor of intervention. As Hehir shows, the Bosnia saga reveals the flagrant contradictions in traditional diplomacy carried out by the industrialized powers, when caught between national interests and human suffering brought on by war and violence. Similarly, the failure of the international community to react to the genocide in Rwanda illuminates the psychological repression and political disengagement which characterizes the politics of powerful states in the face of massive human suffer in a nation where their own power interests are not jeopardized.

 Can the state undertake humanitarian action?

These two examples illustrate how difficult it is to organize joint intervention among state actors, and to maneuver around vested interests (or the lack thereof). Before questioning the difficulty of implemented the right of intervention by states, one should address the philosophical value behind this right. Are the States behave by interests or by moral, especially when some of them are old colonial power? Let us take the debate in France as example. 

In 1979 the French debate over the relationship between humanitarian organizations and humanitarian action lead by the state intensified around two poles, those, which emphasize ‘legitimacy’ derived from the state lead by Bernard Kouchner, and those which prioritize ‘independence’ of humanitarian organizations headed by Claude Malheuret.[2] The latter argue for distance from the state, as the state cannot undertake humanitarian action without its own interests affecting the operation like the intervention in Somalia. In contrast to this position, though the French state, in 1988 created the State Secretariat for Humanitarian Action which follows the directives of the State Secretariat of Human Rights.

Over time, in spite of this cession the perspective, principals and commitments of different humanitarian organizations in France (like Secours Catholique, Doctors Without Borders, Doctors of the World) in favor of “The right to interfere, in spite of frontiers and in spite of states, if suffering persons need aid”, which has been incorporated into several resolutions passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Invoking the vision of the “new human rights order” these resolutions legitimize the role of international NGOs, along with the nation-state. In France, under the presidency of François Mitterand, the right and duty to interfere across borders were woven into what the national government calls its ‘state humanitarian’ policies, and the functions of Secretariat for Humanitarian Health that it established. But the influence of the idea of humanitarian intervention in UN policies and among Western countries has not been without pitfalls. As Fox argue, one of the most serious moral dilemmas that Doctors Without Borders and Doctors of the World face in the field stems from the militarization of humanitarian action: the use of United Nations and national military forces to help with emergency medical care in devastated areas; move large quantities of supplies, materials and personnel to these locations   … (Fox, 1999: 425). In the view of these organizations there is an inherent contradiction between such military interventions, on the one hand, and their mandate of political neutrality and the ‘vocation of healing action’ on the other. In this case, their presence and their interests are likely to be perceived as more adversarial than humanitarian, by the local actors. This is what Brauman has called “humanitarian crime” of “killing under the banner of humanitarians”. Such was the case during operation ‘Restore Hope’ in Somalia, where military actions were taken that appeared to favor one local faction over another, resulting in hostilities against relief workers and a number of deaths. When this occurred, Doctors Without Borders decided to leave Somalia, whereas Doctors of the World opted to stay in the field affirming their continuing belief that, “the specificity of their role would protect them” and that the situation “precluded their departure”, the public health rehabilitation carried out in collaboration with the Somalians, would have to advance to the next stage, before they would leave (Fox, 1999: 424-225). Implicitly revealed in these examples, is the danger that the UN as well as Western states have turned humanitarian aid into a powerful tool of their diplomacy. 

Crisis in the Humanitarian Movement

The passage from the silent observer to the duty of the witness was a long journey. There have indeed been many gains made along the way. But it is important to remember, especially as the humanitarian movement is based on the idea of aiding the victim, casualties of a conflict are not just those, which suffer physical violence; there are also political victims. The expectations of what can be achieved through humanitarian action are often exaggerated. As we have noted, at times the structural contradiction implicit in the idea of humanitarian action is revealed (for instance, the prolongation the war in the former-Yugoslavia). In some cases humanitarian action, is little more than what Walter Benjamin considers as an action, which aims to introduce an ‘utopist present’ into the movement of the history. Rescuing the wounded, feeding the refugees can never resolve the problems these populations face. Nonetheless, while humanitarian action certainly cannot for example, resolve the conflict, it can at least sensitize the public about the situation on the ground and bear witness to the atrocity. However, humanitarian groups can take action, which brings to light the responsibility of the former colonial powers in the birth of some of the problems that exist in the international system, especially in de-colonized nations.

Finally, the humanitarian movement failed to develop a theoretical consistent and rigorous humanitarian ideology. In the first time, it was influenced by the ‘Third World Ideology’ like other international organizations since the 1960s. In this time, these groups call for the centralized development, new world order, etc. However some organizations progressively (like the MSF) started to criticize this ideology and to think on the relationship between moral and politics and take into account the issue of the democracy for the development. Humanitarian organizations today distance themselves from certain political regime, specifically refusing to cooperate with totalitarian regimes. This is one of the major lessons taken from the history of the International Red Cross, which accepted guided visits led by the Nazis in Germany during the Second World War.[3] Doctors Without Borders refused, for instance to cooperate with the Vietnamese government when the latter invades Cambodia. To advance their humanitarian objective the organization organized a ‘marche pour la survie’ (walk for survival) with the support of politicians, intellectuals and artists, in order to bring help to Cambodians. 

In the Palestinian case and during the current Intifada, the discourse of some of the Western media concentrates, thanks to the role of the humanitarian actors, on the ‘politics of pity’, centered on the victim instead of concentrating on the politics of responsibility. For the public opinion sending humanitarian aid is sufficient for expressing the opposing the ethnical purification. If humanitarian aid can be a factor in impelling justice, it can also be part of that which sustains injustice (Brauman, 1996: 69). The ethics underlying emergency assistance have turned against the Palestinians, who are no longer, an occupied people fighting for freedom, but victims to be fed. They are not granted the right to decide whether they prefer a supportive political position or humanitarian aid, it was decided for them: in this sense, humanitarian aid can encourage and favor the aggressor.  

Another problem faces all humanitarian organizations, as Fox argues following Vaclav Havel, is how to be global and at the same time multicultural taking into account the variety of values and cultures in the countries of the intervention. This point will be examined in many places in this book. Just now we can point out that in the case of Médecins Sans Frontières and Médecins du Monde this issue is certainly related to the disregard of French culture to the multicultural, but the problem also concerns a wide range of humanitarian organizations. The commitment to human rights and freedoms to human dignity and social justice are an integral part of their globalism. They regard these values not only as generally held universal principals to which people in all societies and cultures aspire, but also as constituent elements of a fully human person.

How the Palestinian NGOs interact with the humanitarian organizations?

The current Intifada represents a unique moment to observe the behavior of the international NGOs, humanitarian organizations and donors during a quasi-war period and the interaction between them  with the Palestinian NGOs, especially given that during the peace process these both sides of organizations withdrew from the national-political question, including the reality of the occupation.

From the international organizations (INGOs) side, the intifada has revealed their incapability to confirm themselves as witnesses, in a period of crisis and war. In comparison to the solidarity model of the first intifada, the synergy between local and international organizations has slow to develop. Many of the donor countries asked their representatives to evacuate the Palestinian territories and withdraw to Jerusalem or to return home, without even asking the opinion of local PNGOs. In general, many of the donors including, the American, British and German governments and international organizations like the UNDP had their staff evacuated, during the first few months, although many returned at a later date. Nonetheless, in such a context the international organizations on the ground do not serve as a resource for their headquarters or for the press and the public in their home country. This illustrates the limitations of substituting solidarity groups with professionalized international organization.

Moreover, if the solidarity groups are at one end of the spectrum and the professionalized INGOs at another, it is important to locate where particular INGOs fall in this continuum. In the intifada, few of the INGOs remaining in the Palestinian territories were acting as solidarity groups. The majority was closer to model of the professionalized INGOs. However, the issue is not that all INGOs must function as solidarity groups, but rather the manner in which they articulate each of these aspects, when necessary. Some organizations in health sector, such as Italian INGOs are highly professionalized, and thus they are able to receive bids from EC for health projects. But when it comes to being a witness to a human crisis as in Palestine, they fail to be here to document what is going on or this speaks on behalf of the events (and local NGOs) to their representatives and the press of their own country.

Some INGOs, like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), sent a commission and published a report. In general, while MSF has good will[4], it follows the mainstream approach to framing Palestinians, their website label the Palestinian Territories as ‘Palestinian Authority’. They remain in the mainstream paradigm, contesting the human rights violations, not the occupation.

The position of the development organizations is very different of the solidarity group during this intifada. Even when the former is used to show solidarity with the Palestinian cause, their statement takes into account the censorship and the lobbying in the headquarters in Western countries. For comparison, the reader can see the different statements, like Statement on Recent Events from the Association of International Development Agencies in Palestine[5] (AIDA)[6] and that of Canadian solidarity groups which urge the Canadian Government to protect the Palestinians.[7]

About the role of PNGOs during this intifada, their role was influenced by the various facors but mainly the global system of aid industry and thus their interaction with the INGOs. It is out of scope of this article to develop that, reader can refer to our book, Donors, International organizations and Local NGOs: the Emergence of Palestinian Globalized Elite (Hanafi, Tabar, 2002), however, three observations can be made:

First, NGOs have not moved beyond professionalized action. On the one hand, this is not necessarily bad, especially as effective forms of transnational networking and advocacy work to convey Palestinian rights internationally, require highly capable organizations, endowed with the resources and skills to communicate, network and lobby across borders. Yet, Palestinian NGOs face the problem of dependency on few specialized people if professionalized activities are not supplemented with local grassroots networking and strategies for action. In the context of the renewed national struggle, the Palestinian NGOs have not developed a synergy with the population or other political and social organizations.

Second, many PNGOs have reverted into the familiar pattern of short-term relief work. This in turn reflects the absence of a long-term vision or strategy on how the NGOs and social organizations can contribute to change in the context of national transition.

The third observation concerns the incapability of NGOs to articulate the civic with politics or to separate the ‘politics’ from the ‘national’.  Their actions betray a lack of awareness of the fact that they are in an occupied land. NGO leaders are from the urban middle class; this Intifada is taking place in the refugee camps, the remote cities in the North and South of the West Bank, and in the South of Gaza, more than in the urban centers like Ramallah. At the same time, this Intifada is not simply political, but social and economic and is propelled by people who did not gain from the peace process. Moreover, the ongoing Intifada expresses cumulative popular anger at both the violence of the Israeli occupation and meager achievement of the PNA in the peace process and its bad management to the public affairs.

NGOs have been absent from the demonstrations taking place in the Palestinian streets, especially in the first year of the Intifada, and at the same time they continue to insist on their independence from the political parties and other political bodies. The only big demonstration where the NGOs played a major role in mobilizing the population in the first year of the Intifada was when the Israeli occupation authorities closed the road leading to Birzeit University. The Ramallah elites, NGOs or not, suddenly found themselves very concerned with the consequences of the Intifada. Many organizations used their email lists and took out advertisements in the local newspapers to mobilize people for a demonstration from Ramallah to the new checkpoint imposed on the road to Birzeit. In light of their successful mobilization effort, one NGO leader declared to the French Newspaper, La Croix, that they should henceforth impose their position to the National and Islamic High Committee of the Intifada: “our activities are independent from that of Marwan Barghouthi [a leader of this committee]. It is our pressure which made him take into account civil society (...) However he does not consider us as an entire part of his committee. We signed the press communiqués. However we did not take position on the political aspect like the call for Sharon to resign. Inside of the committee our voice is well heard” (emphasize by us) (Larzilliere, 2001). It is very curious to observe such an a-political discourse inside a war-like context and one is surprised by the superior disposition in which the globalized elite looks at itself as above the committee, which manages the Intifada on a daily basis.

Furthermore, it is evident that NGO leaders confuse between the ‘political’ and the ‘national’ and refuse to commit to the national under the pretense of refusing to conduct political activities, although many NGOs show more and more of an internal politicization in terms of alliance building. For instance, many communiqués released during the first year of the Intifada were circulated among NGOs and political party leaders for signature, but they asked for personal signatures and not the endorsement of organizations. This shows that these leaders do not see NGOs as taking on a leadership role in national issues.

Consider the following example, at the beginning of the Intifada, during a PNGOs Network meeting held after the head of USAID in Tel Aviv announced the intention to make further aid conditional on positive political developments [8], some members in this network refused to call for a boycott of USAID funding under the pretext that: “200 families have live off of USAID salaries”. This is not just a case of short-term funding supplanting long-term vision, but there seems to be a tension between vested group interests and the overriding national political imperative.

At the same time, while the NGOs are searching for a role and place in the society, they lack the willingness and legitimacy to take on such a role. George Giacaman director of Muwatin and a professor of philosophy in Birzeit University, reported that in the second month of the Intifada, a meeting was held in Ramallah for representatives of municipalities, unions, federations, the PLC and NGOs in order to fill the leadership vacuum within civilian affairs. During this meeting, most of the time was taken up with conflicts over the leadership role and structure. Giacaman points out that part of the reason why this initiative did not succeed was because of the “instability in the legitimacy (of NGOs’ role) and the absence of the legal and administrative structure for insuring this legitimacy” (2001).

For Hammami and Tamari, the fact that NGOs’ lack a mass base and focus on development and governance issues makes them structurally incapable of organizing on the popular level (2001). However the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, was able to mobilize in its anniversary 10,000 supporters from its beneficiaries and the numerous dispensaries, which belong to this organization in the few months before the Intifada: why were these same people not able to be organized thereafter?   

NGOs lack the potential for national mobilization, but do play a pivotal role as professional bodies. During this Intifada, there are numerous examples in professional works which illustrate the contributions they have made, ranging from timely release of information on human rights violations, to efforts to confront the image of the Intifada in the Western media. For instance, the Red Crescent Society provides accurate and up to date statistics on the number and type of injuries as well as on the number of deaths during the uprising. The Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute [HDIP] produced a report on the effects of the Intifada on the delivery of health care. The Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees as well as the Institute of Community and Public Health of Birzeit University produced two videos for Western audiences to address the misperceptions and stereotypes distorting the image of the uprising.[9] Human rights organizations responded quickly to the Intifada and many developed an effective system for disseminating information on human rights violations. Additionally, it is evident that the training of health care workers and ambulance staff in emergency procedures, over the past decade was very useful. The ambulance and first aid teams that have attended to the injured were more professional than during the first Intifada. People at demonstration have also been able to provide first aid for the wounded while waiting for the ambulances. This reveal the importance of the work carried out by health organizations before the Intifada in terms of providing training courses to the population.

Overall, PNGOs have fulfilled an important function, acting as highly professional and competent intermediaries between their society and the international public, by disseminating information, making alternative forms of knowledge available and receiving foreign delegations in Palestine. This role in part enables the population to carry on in the Intifada. On a similar note, many reports produced by international NGOs shows before the Israeli invasion to West Bank in March 2002 that contrary to other conflict areas in the world, the Palestinians have been able to maintain good quality services in health, education, nutrition, despite the closure and bantustanization of the Palestinian territories.[10] 

This not withstanding, it is also clear that despite the useful and effective professional actions taken by PNGOs, little synergy has developed with the mass population. The human rights organizations showed from their first meeting anincapability to coordinate their work in order to conduct joint activities.  At the same time, little was done by other organizations in terms of mobilizing people, encouraging voluntarism, or directing the public by providing a leadership role. Muwatin was a pioneer in initiating debates on the Intifada. It sponsored a large conference attended by about 600 people, with representatives from the PNA present. However, this and similar public forums have yet to channel social energies in any particular direction. In terms of the next step and how to go beyond the conference mode of action, to raise issues in tangible manner in the society, little follow up has been taken.

Short-term Relief

During this uprising many PNGOs have reverted into short-term relief work. Yet, their contribution to the emergency to assistance for the population has been very little. According to a poll conducted by Bocco, Brunner and Rabah (July 2001), the international and Palestinian NGOs provide only 7% of emergency assistance. UNRWA was identify as the main single source of assistance (51%) followed by religious organizations (18%), then the PNA (22%) and finally the charitable organizations (13%).

Problems have arisen with the emergency assistance that has been provided, especially among the trend of providing people with food aid, when what they really are lacking is a job as opposed to welfare services.[11]  In regard to the Palestinian NGOs’ role in short-term relief, while the assistance they have provided in this regard has been essential, the failure to supplement it with broader activism within the uprising, indicates that they have yet to develop a long-term vision on how to contribute to change in the context of national liberation.

Let us take the example of the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC) to illustrate this. PARC exemplifies the transformation PNGOs have undergone overtime. During the first Intifada, the organization had a network of volunteers in villages throughout the West Bank and Gaza. Yet this has diminished overtime, and today a few volunteers remain. The current Intifada and the Israeli closure and encirclement policies have strangled the Palestinian economy and taken an immense toll on Palestinian farmers. In this context, PARC has stepped in to provide effective forms of short-term relief. For example, it supports cooperative schemes, such as one in Ramallah, where farmers bring their olive oil for it to be packaged and shipped to abroad. PARC not only covers 70% of the costs of the cooperatives, but it utilizes contacts, such as Oxfam, to find a market for the goods, many of which are being sold in Oxfam fair-trade stores in Europe.[12] Indeed, an important form of relief assistance yet this short-term role should be contextualized and situated within the broader challenges facing the Palestinian society.

Since the beginning of this uprising, the political reality in the Palestine has once again been transformed, and today both the challenge of the anti-colonial struggle and the agenda calling for democratization of political structures frame the social horizon. Intermediary Palestinian organizations (the big Palestinian NGOs) are in the midst of this fluid and fluctuating political and social terrain. They are not linked to the mass population which is suffering, not only at the hands of the Israel beseigement on Palestinian villages, but is also affected by the changes in the national movement. In the context of an uprising, in which the main confrontations are occurring outside populated areas, and armed resistance has become a central dimension of the Intifada; and at the same time, with the absence of large scale delivery of emergency assistance or collective support mechanisms, the population is retreating to private sphere and individual survival mechanisms.[13] Moreover, some describe the signs of increased self-sufficiency apparent in the villages as follows; “this is a self-reliance that is based on a need to survive and a product of desperation. It is not the product of a grassroots movement – of communities that are working together to achieve a common goal.”[14] In this respect, it is clear that while some PNGOs such as PARC are providing effective forms of short-term relief and others have engaged in professionalized forms of action, there seems to be a lack of vision on how to bridge the complex challenges facing the society at present.

 Bibliography

Bettati, Mario (1999) ‘Un droit d'ingerence?, Revue generale de droit international public, p. 644.

Bocco, Brunner and Rabah (2001), INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL AID DURING THE SECOND INTIFADA. An Analysis of Palestinian Public Opinion in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (February - June 2001) - Report II, July.

Bouchet-Saulnier, Françoise (2000) The principles and practices of "rebellious humanitarianism, MSF International Activity Report, 2000.

Brauman, Rony  (1996) humanitarian le dilemma. Paris: Textuel

Brauman, Rony (2000) L’action humanitarian. Paris: Flammarion

Corten, Olivier (1999) ‘Humanitarian Intervention: a Controversial Right’, UNESCO Courier, July/August.

Giacaman, George (2000). “Perspectives on Civil Society.” M.K. Shadid and C. Qutteneh (eds). Palestinian Governmental - NGO Relations: Co-operation and Partnership. Proceedings of the International Conference, February 14-16, 2000. Organized by Welfare Association Consortium in Consultation with the World Bank.  

Hammami, Rema and Salim Tamari (2000), “Anatomy of Another Rebellion,” in Middle East Report 217, Winter.

Hanafi, Sari and Linda Tabar (2002) Donors, International organizations and Local NGOs: The Emergence of the Palestinian Globalized Elite. In Arabic: Ramallah: Muwatin; in English London: Pluto.

Hehir, J. Bryan (1999) ‘Intervention militaire et souveraineté nationale: une relation à repenser’  in Des Choix difficiles. Les Dilemmes moraux de l’humanitaire. Paris: Gallimard, p. 49-81.

Larzilliere, Pénélope (2000) ‘Intifada: un tournant ?’, in La Croix,  Paris, lundi 2 avril 2001.

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